Catalans: a renewed nationalist movement

Laura Quintana Soms, who interns with MRG’s Street Theatre Programme, explores recent and rapidly changing notions of nationalism in her Catalan homeland

11th September 1714. This is the most important date for any Catalan. It commemorates the siege of Barcelona by the Bourbon monarchy, which led to the loss of Catalan self-rule.  Over time, as this region of Spain became more industrialized, Catalonia  witnessed an increasing number of nationalist movements.

Although Catalan parties had never been clear about their ideas of nationalism and support for a Catalan state, their convictions seem to have changed since 11^th September 2012, when more than 1.5 million people took part in the annual independence day commemoration in Barcelona. People from all over the region traveled to the city waving the Catalan independence flag and shouting “Independència” (‘independence’) or “Catalunya no és Espanya” (‘Catalonia is not Spain’).

11th September 2012 demonstrations in Barcelona. Credit: Meritxell Prat.

Since then, Catalan nationalism seems to have gone from strength to strength, and many political parties are moving towards the idea of a Catalan nation. None more so than the governing Convergència i Unió (CiU), who, after the September demonstration, decided to call an election on 25^th November, although they were only in their second year of a four year term.

The outcome however of the election, with a considerable turn-out of 69.56%, has been a disaster for the CiU, who lost 12 seats. Despite these negative results for the main party, the elections showed that most Catalans support a nationalist movement, because the three main parties advocating the independence of Catalonia (CiU, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya and Candidatura d’Unitat Popular) gained a majority in the Parliament (74 out of a total of 135 seats).

However, the pro-independence movement is full of contradictions. While the region’s government agreed to hold an independence referendum by 2014, at the same time they asked the Spanish central government for a bailout of 9 billion euros. The Catalan government seems to blame the central government for the economic problems that the region is suffering, whilst the central government opposes Catalan secession and the referendum, labeling it as ‘unconstitutional’.

So what nowadays is considered a nation, and why have the parties changed their stance?

One of the main scholars in the study of nations, Anthony D. Smith, defined the ‘nation’ as, ‘a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members, complemented by a common language, the feeling of belonging to a community and a desire for self-government’. With this definition in mind, it seems that Catalonia can be considered a ‘nation’, as it ticks all the boxes necessary to be defined as such.

However, what has caused the shift in opinion of both the people of the region and the political parties is the concept of ‘national identity’ and not the concept of ‘nation’. In the literature of ‘nationalism’ most scholars such as Hans Kohn, Peter Sahlins, Montserrat Guibernau, John Hutchinson or Thomas Hylland Eriksen, have discussed this concept.

Friedrich Meinecke divided national identity into ‘civic’ or ‘ethnic’. Throughout history scholars have addressed this dichotomy and nowadays, generally speaking, the concept of civic could be quoted as ‘political, territorial and rational’. On the other hand, the ‘ethnic’ concept of national identity could be understood as ‘cultural, organic and inherent’.

Applying this theory to the Catalan context we can see a transition from a ‘civic’ national identity towards an ‘ethnic’ notion of it. This could be caused by the current economic crisis that this region, and the state within which it sits, is suffering, with six million people unemployed. But it could be also caused by the policies that the Spanish government is putting into practice in education, health and economy.

Although the causes are not clear, what it is true is that Catalan parties and society are moving towards a more ethnic- based concept of national identity of ‘us’ highlighting ‘our’ culture, ‘our’ past, ‘our’ language, ‘our’ traditions, ‘our’ story, and ‘our’ history. The notion of ‘us against them’ is growing and thus the tension between the Catalan and Spanish governments is heightened.

If this change affects how Catalan parties perceive immigration will be discussed in a future post.

Latvia’s ‘aliens’

Julia Babahina, MRG’s former Fundraising Intern who was born into a Russian family from Latvia, reports from a very personal perspective on the current situation of the Russian minority in her country. Almost a third of Latvian Russians are given non-citizen/alien status, which has drawn widespread criticism from international organisations. The rejection of a referendum in February 2012 to amend the Latvian Constitution to include Russian as an official language proved once again the ethnic split in the country.

Latvia’s citizenship policy, which assigns almost a third of Latvian Russians non-citizen/alien status, prohibits non-citizens from taking part in many aspects of society, such as seeking employment, travelling abroad, or voting during national elections. Even though the Latvian government ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on 6 June 2005, there is still a considerable part of the Russian population who cannot freely participate in Latvian economic, political and cultural life.

The policy has been severely criticised by the Council of Europe, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Knut Vollebekk, OSCE’s High Commissioner for National Minorities, recently said that all children of non-citizens who were born after Latvia’s independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, must be granted citizenship automatically.

According to data from the Population Register of the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs in Latvia, as of 2011, 27.3 per cent of the Latvian population are Russian and 34.6 per cent of these are designated as ‘non-citizens’ or given ‘alien’ status. According to the Citizenship Law of Latvia, a non-citizen ‘is a person who, in accordance with the Law on the Status of those Former U.S.S.R. Citizens, do not have the Citizenship of Latvia or that of any Other State, has the right to a non-citizen passport issued by the Republic of Latvia.’

An “alien’s passport” of Latvia. Credit: Tina Remiz (http://www.fotovisura.com/user/tinaremiz/view/krievi)

Being born into a Russian family from Latvia myself, I have been granted citizenship through my father, whereas my mother was a non-citizen until 2006. My uncle and my grandmother are still non-citizens. I asked my grandmother how it feels.

‘It is heartbreaking and unfair. It is like you have been born into a family and they don’t accept you as their child. The state, the government, and society is the family, and we, non-citizens, are unwanted and alienated children.’

Though all the members of my family were born in Latvia and have lived there for most of their lives, they have no right to vote or work in many state-employed organisations and often have trouble crossing the border. For many Russians in Latvia it is a matter of principle not to apply for citizenship as they think it is absurd given the fact they were born in the country.

Tatjana Zdanoka, one of Latvia’s nine members of the European Parliament and a Latvian Russian, argues that if the Russian community is under-represented in society it is discriminated against, and has urged the international community to support Baltic Russians to claim their rights. Thanks to Zdanoka’s and others’ hard work, in 2007 non-citizens were allowed to benefit from the Schengen Agreement.

On May 2011, 122 recommendations were made to Latvia during the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) at the UNHRC in Geneva. The Latvian government rejected seven of these recommendations, including Russia’s recommendation to eliminate the system of non-citizenship. Russia claimed that Latvia’s refusal proved that it does not recognise the severe human rights problem in the country and stated that it violated international human rights law. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia replied that Latvia meets its international obligations in terms of minority rights and held that the non-citizen system is purely an internal affair.

Latvians voting in the February 2012 referendum on whether to introduce Russian as a second official language. Credit: Pablo Andrés Rivero

The Russian government then suggested Latvia accept the human rights recommendations laid out during the UPR so that the call for a referendum, initiated by the Russian speakers’ movement in February 2012 to make Russian language a second official language, would be avoided. The referendum was an unsurprising consequence of people’s dissatisfaction with minority rights in Latvia. Even though 75 per cent of citizens voted against introducing Russian as an official language, it showed the existence of an ethnic divide in Latvian society.

According to Rita Izsak, the UN independent expert on minority issues, the referendum did not prove the superiority of one community over another, but demonstrated that the Latvian government should bring the two communities together and assist them in overcoming fear, mistrust and historical prejudices. However, Latvian nationalists claimed that the referendum was Russia’s attempt to weaken Latvia’s independence.

Today, when Latvian integration issues threaten to polarise the country even further along political and ethnic lines, it is time for the Latvian government to realise that the country’s ethnic diversity does not weaken, but strengthens the country. Latvian integration policies should bring Latvians and Latvian Russians together for a brighter future.

Museum exhibits: an informative piece representing a thriving culture, or a relic of a declining one?

Elvira Nurieva, who recently interned at MRG’s Europe office in Budapest, reflects on the deeper meaning of museum artifacts from indigenous cultures

During my recent visit to the Museum of Ethnography in Budapest, Hungary, I pondered upon a recurring hypothesis of mine about artifacts being both exhibits from a disappearing culture, and symbols of the policies that can lead to the extinction of a distinct language and culture.

Folk bag. Credit: Museum of Ethnography (Budapest).

Studying hand-made objects and colourful photos of women in their national dresses, I caught sight of a piece of information for visitors, revealing that in 2010 the International Finno-Ugrian Congress was held in Hungary, and the representatives of different Finno-Ugrian peoples made a gift to the Museum of Ethnography. At that point my thoughts drifted back to the situation of Mari people in the Republic of Mari El, in the Russian Federation.

Mari women in traditional clothes. Credit: Osmo Joronen webpage

Mari are an indigenous people belonging to one of the five Finno-Ugric language groups; the most sizeable of which are the Hungarians, the Finns and the Estonians. Mari can be divided into three ethnic subgroups: Hill (Kuryk) Mari, Meadow (Olyk) Mari and Eastern (Upo) Mari. Meadow Mari are the largest group. There are two literary languages among Mari and several different dialects are spoken. Mari (who number 670,000) make up almost one-half of the Republic of Mari El (capital city Yoshkar-Ola, meaning Red City), located in the north of the Volga region of the Russian Federation.

Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, the former Mari Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was recognized as a constituent republic of the new Russian Federation. According to a 2006 report by the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights and Moscow Helsinki Group, in April 1990 a major grass-roots organization Mari Ushem was set up to promote “the revival of the Mari people,” to advocate for the Mari language to become official in all schools in the republic, and for all civil servants to have bilingual competency.

Sovereignty was declared in October 1990 and the name of the republic was changed to Mari El. The early 1990s were also marked by the revival of cultural trends in Mari El. For instance, in addition to the bilingual Mari National Theater, there was also a new Mari Youth Theater where performances were in Mari only. In comparison with most eastern Finno-Ugric nations still struggling to secure native-language education in the first four grades, the authorities of the republic promoted and protected language and culture by education in the Mari language in public schools, and public funds were allocated to promote Mari language media and Mari cultural activities. Importantly, the 1995 Mari El Constitution included a provision requiring the president of the republic to have command of both state languages. However, the Russian Supreme Court later declared this requirement unconstitutional.

Unfortunately a sizeable change for the worst arrived in the cultural and political life of the Mari people with the launch of federal reforms by President Putin during his first term, between 2000 and 2004. According to state statistics, in 2004 a total of 15 publicly funded Mari language newspapers and magazines and only one privately funded Mari language newspaper were published in the republic.

The spread of the Russian language at the cost of the Mari language has been observed in schools and nursery schools, and also in family homes. In terms of political participation and access to power, although the Mari people make up 43 percent of Mari El’s population, in the republic’s Parliament they constitute only one-quarter of its members.

Where is this boundary between an exhibit as an informative piece of a thriving culture and a relic of a declining one? Knowing that the vitality of a language depends mainly on the number of its speakers, particularly its native speakers, the outlook is somewhat gloomy for Mari.

With the prospect that one hundred years from now the majority of the languages existing today might be extinct, all eyes are on policy-makers of those states where the majority languages are spoken, who have all the political, legal, financial powers to make a positive difference.

Beyond Memory: The Crimean Tatars’ Deportation and Return – review

Former MRG Europe intern Elvira Nurieva reviews Greta Lynn Uehling’s 2004 book

In her book Beyond Memory: The Crimean Tatars’ Deportation and Return (2004), Greta Lynn Uehling, a lecturer at Eastern Michigan University, Ypsilanti, and Wayne State University, Detroit, explores the question Why did second-generation Tatars who had never lived in Crimea feel compelled to return to their historic homeland after over fifty years in exile in the Soviet Central Asia, primarily Uzbekistan (1944-1967)?

Using archival materials, personal accounts and the findings of her field research, the author contends that the desire to repatriate was sustained by practices of collectively remembering the homeland.

Book cover

Delving into the ethnogenesis of the Crimean Tatars (Turkic-speaking, Sunni Muslim people), Uehling investigates their formation as the ancient, indigenous peoples of the Crimean peninsula who have pre-Mongol origins, which goes in contrast with the conventional theory describing them as descendants of the Golden Horde. The Crimean Tatars identify themselves as indigenous on the grounds of their history, along with the Karaims and Krymchaks (two Turkic Jewish minorities). Arguing that the development of an indigenous group is linked to a specific territory with its atmosphere and landschaft, Uehling advances the claim that a forced relocation of such a group results either in their assimilation or annihilation.

Repatriation, which became possible only in 1967, was indeed painful: not able to obtain a residence permit or become employed in Crimea, or to resist the authorities’ attempts at eviction and re-deportation, the Crimean Tatars resorted to land-seizing and threats of self-immolation.

These events, depicted in Uehling’s book, are as relevant today. The Shadow Report submitted to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination by the Social Action Centre –“No Borders” project (SAC) and Minority Rights Group International to evaluate Ukraine’s performance in July 2011, confirms the perpetual difficulties of daily life that the Crimean Tatars still face.

Part 2: Indigenous languages are important but are they useful?

In the second of two blogs reporting from the Expert Seminar on Indigenous Peoples’ Languages and Cultures, Daniel Openshaw, MRG’s Publications Intern, questions why destruction of intangible culture is often overlooked and what incentive exists to learn an indigenous language.

When the Taliban blew up the Buddhas of Bamiyan in Afghanistan in 2001 it sparked international outcry. This was an act of intolerance by a global enemy. The buddhas were massive, tangible representations of Greco-Buddhist art and key examples of 6^th century engineering. It was indisputably a cultural disaster. But according to UNESCO’s endangered languages programme, half of the 6000 languages spoken today, will be lost by the end of the century.

Academics and NGO representatives listen to a panel of experts discussing Indigenous Peoples’ rights to languages and cultures.

Last month I attended the Expert Seminar on Indigenous Peoples’ Language and Cultures at Brunel University. Javier Sanchez, one of the speakers and Director of the National Institute for Indigenous Languages in Mexico, asked participants to imagine how they would feel if they woke up tomorrow and were told that they were not able to use the language they had learned from their parents. This is a situation affecting thousands of indigenous people daily and will inevitably exacerbate UNESCO’s predictions. Is this not a cultural disaster equal to the dynamiting of the Buddhas of Bamiyan?

In my last blog I discussed the importance of preserving and promoting cultural rights (including linguistic rights) and the inseparability of these with land rights. I finished by noting how the African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights ruled in favour of the indigenous Endorois in Kenyabased on cultural integrity, but how the definition of this term did not include peoples’ right to language. Language and culture are obviously interlinked, but at the seminar Dr Mark Harris of Adelaide University highlighted that they must be seen as individual rights. In some cases of Aboriginal land rights in Australia, land claims are embedded in language and the lack of indigenous languages has led to restrictions on land rights.

An Ampilatwatja elder sets up camp in the bush to demand their rights to land and self-determination. Credit: Rusty Stewart

This is a recurring issue throughout the seminar. Language rights are important, we were sitting in a room full of people who understood this importance, but not everybody does. Referring to my previous question regarding whether the loss of language is akin to the destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan, the lack of public concern on this issue would suggest not. There is both opposition to and, more dangerously, widespread apathy towards indigenous languages. It is possible that we will be able to preserve them (in the history books) but promoting them will be much more difficult. What is the incentive?

Indigenous languages are important, but are they useful? Major world languages are useful; of the UN’s 6 working languages, French is the international language, English is the international language of business and Chinese is hot on its heels whilst Spanish, Arabic and Russian are spoken across many states. There is a real incentive to spend a lot of time and effort learning these languages. At the seminar it was addressed that learning an indigenous language as either a second language or alongside a first helps the learning of third, fourth and fifth languages, but still, this might seem an unnecessary hurdle to someone who wants to learn a language as a gateway to opportunity. The problem of incentive is not limited to non-indigenous people. In Norway, perhaps through past forced assimilation but nevertheless, the Saami are integrated into Norwegian society, in the main speak Norwegian as their first language and feel they have no need to learn Saami. They lack incentive.

When I introduced this question of incentive at the seminar Dr Harris suggested that it was simply a question of securing the right for indigenous communities to learn- or not to learn- their mother tongue and for wider society to recognize this right.  Incentive to choose to learn as opposed to not learn came in the form of responsibility. At the heart of the matter this is true. It does come down to a sense of pride in one’s language and responsibility to promote its longevity. But is this enough? People have a responsibility to throw litter in the bin in order to protect and promote the visual appeal of their environment, but not everybody does. Responsibility can be a strong incentive and can be used to persuade people to act in a certain way- look at Mao’s China- but in terms of learning a language and the considerable dedication involved, I’m not sure it’s enough (definitely not outside of indigenous communities) to learn an indigenous language.

Javier Sanchez gave a more optimistic answer to the question of incentive. He recounted how there used to be no incentive to learn one of Mexico’s 364 linguistic variants. However since a change in legislation to promote indigenous languages in 1993 there are now intercultural universities, indigenous media broadcasts and the use of indigenous language in civic and public life. Perhaps this is the incentive people need both within and outside of indigenous communities. If, for example court hearings were heard in Saami, then there would be demand for Saami speaking lawyers. If there were Innu TV channels then there would be demand for Innu-aimun speaking presenters. Dr Sheila Aikmen of the University of East Anglia also suggested that bilingual education, which is fairly widespread, should be available to all, not just indigenous peoples, as this in itself can be marginalizing.

The Expert Seminar and work of the Expert Mechanism are indications that the cultural and linguistic rights of indigenous peoples need to become more prominent. In my view, incentive is the key and it is slowly emerging. A new law is going through the motions in Ukraine that would allow court cases to be heard in minority languages, such as Crimean-Tatar; this is just one example cited in this year’s ‘State of the World’s Minorities and Indigenous Peoples’ to be launched in June. Destruction of language is in large a passive process towards an intangible culture. Bringing the issue to the international stage is an optimistic beginning but there is a long way to go before it is seen in the same way as active destruction of tangible culture.

Enough is enough. Hate speech and discriminatory policies lead to harassment.

MRG Communications intern Claudia Santoro gets hot under the collar about the violent consequences of stereotyping of Italy’s Roma.

In my previous blog posts I have argued that hate speech in the media and politics is both unfair and exposes the weakness of many democracies. It should also be seen however as an alarm bell; a spark that can trigger a dangerous cycle of violence. Even so, I was shocked to learn that, following a 16 year old girl’s declaration that she was raped by two Roma men(an accusation which subsequently turned out to be false) a group of hooded men set fire to a Traveller camp near Turin.

A camp resident the day after the attack. Credit: REPUBBLICA.

According to reports, after the girl’s claim hundreds of residents of the suburb near Turin where she lives took to the streets to take part in an “anti-Roma demonstration”. A group of the demonstrators later split from the main protest and marched towards a nearby Traveller camp. After driving away the only resident who was in the camp at the time, they destroyed houses, cars, and caravans. Only when the girl admitted she had in fact not been raped but had had sexual relations with a friend and wished to hide it from her family, were the police and her brother able to stop the violence.

This tragic story not only illustrates the dangers of stereotyping certain members of society, but also exposes the harsh conditions faced by Roma communities in Italy and highlights the fact that policy for the integration of minorities has not been effective in the country.

Furthermore, it shows how biased rhetoric about Roma has a deep effect on the public perception of this maligned community. This unacceptable event is the result of discriminatory policies, expressed earlier this year by a series of evictions, and a widespread anti-Roma discourse in Italy, often multiplied in its effect by the media.

Even if just a small group of people are responsible for this attack, it clearly confirms that the Roma minority is seen as a danger by a certain part of the population.

Maybe if both government and local authorities made more responsible and effective decisions rather than just evicting Roma from their camps, people would be less worried about so-called outsiders. And perhaps if the media stopped blaming minorities for the economic crisis and for the lack of security there would also be fewer incidents. What is sure is that racism should never be allowed to raise its head in such an ugly way.

Education against hate

Claudia Santoro, MRG’s Communications intern, continues her series of blogs on discrimination against Roma in Europe and looks this time at initiatives to reverse the worrying trend of increased hostility and hate speech towards the region’s largest minority.

Hate speech used in the mayor of Milan’s electoral campaign was back in the news last week when the Council of Europe published Commissioner Thomas Hammarberg’s report about his visit to Italy.

He expressed his concern about ‘anti-Roma political discourse’, which ‘perpetuates anti-Gypsyism’ and recognised the need for political parties to establish a system of self-regulation to avoid racist behaviour. Among the interesting observations contained in the report, I strongly agree with the need to disseminate unbiased information about Roma, both to be used by journalists as background information for reporting on these issues and also to balance inaccurate coverage about Roma and Travellers, which enhances stereotypes and blocks integration with mainstream society.

Credit: Justice Directorate General of the European Commission

Unfortunately in many EU countries where an anti-Roma/Sinti discourse is present in both the media and political arenas, discrimination follows. In his report Commissioner Hammarberg recalls examples of authorities using hate speech towards minorities in Hungary, Czech Republic, Denmark and France and warns that it ‘should not be underestimated’. It can encourage violence; in the Czech Republic for instance, following the Nový Bydžov Mayor’s public statements on Roma, extremist groups attacked a demonstration of Roma communities.

In the UK, the recent events at Dale Farm, led Janet Burden, the Rabbi of the West Central Liberal Synagogue & Ealing Liberal Synagogue, to compare the current persecution of Roma, Gypsies and Irish Travellers with the discrimination ‘Jews faced in the first half of the 20th century’ and, as reported in a recent Guardian article, she also drew attention to the fact that  the language used about Roma ‘clearly echoes rhetoric of anti-Semitism’.

As Commissioner Hammarberg stated in his speech delivered at the Summit of Mayors on Roma, both media professionals and politicians ‘should avoid using stigmatising speech against the Roma and should not feed the age-old prejudices against this minority. Sweeping generalisations about Roma and Travellers, in particular concerning their involvement in crime, feed the false stereotypes’.

I think that the need to involve Roma representatives in mainstream societies’ public activities is the most powerful way to actively promote a conscientious approach towards this minority. Surely this must also include the recruitment of journalists with Roma and other ethnic backgrounds in order to contribute to a more diverse, higher standard of journalism?

Credit: Decade of Roma Inclusion

The Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005–2015, aims to improve Roma’s social inclusion through targeted projects such as the Roma Education Fund, which will develop educational opportunities for Roma communities. The guide ‘Beyond Rhetoric’ includes recommendations to the European Commission based on the experience of the Open Society Foundations as well as country-specific recommendations from independent experts.

Finally, Colorful but Colorblind is a project aimed at remedying anti-Roma stereotyping through the creative use of multimedia in European Union new member states in Central and Eastern Europe. It represents one of the many significant projects necessary to generate change which benefits culture and knowledge.

These initiatives turn words into actions: the creation of opportunities rather than discriminatory rhetoric is a path to create a conscious society. Skilled young Roma can help to eradicate stereotypes, but also mainstream society has to play a role in this integration process. Are we ready to end discrimination?

Italy’s billboards of hate

Claudia Santoro, who recently spent four months as an intern with MRG’s communications team, looks at how the media affects public perception of Roma in Italy and how the Decade of Roma Inclusion is perhaps falling short of its aim to support impoverished and segregated communities.

The media has the power to turn the spotlight onto emergencies and social issues. At the same time the way it presents reality can strongly influence public opinion. In this context, the way the media portrays minorities can create a hierarchy where there are first and second-class minorities. This is certainly evident in the portrayal of Roma in Europe.

During the past months I’ve found it hard to believe how discrimination against Roma has been publicly addressed in Italy. In May, during the campaign for the election of the mayor of Milan, members of the People of Freedom Party and the anti-immigration Northern League, the parties that retain the majority in the government, created huge billboards with explicit racist attacks targeted against Roma.

Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi stated on his party website, ‘If Pisapia [the opposition’s candidate] wins, Milan will became a Gypsyville of Roma camps’ and ‘Milan cannot turn into a zingaropoli [Gypsytown].’

A xenophobic billboard used during the election campaign for the Mayor of Milan. Credit: REPUBBLICA

The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, Thomas Hammarberg, who was visiting Italy during the political campaign , said he was ‘shocked by the use of xenophobic messages against Romas.’ This statement must be welcomed, but my question is: how long it is going to take to repair the damage caused by the hate speech contained in those billboards?

Just a few weeks before, in Rome, many communities had been evicted from unauthorised settlements in the suburbs of the capital city. These actions affected pregnant women and many children and made some 700 Roma people homeless. But by that time, the arrival of large numbers of migrants from North Africa to the southern island of Lampedusa created a bigger emergency and eventually diverted media attention away from the Roma evictions.

Roma live in very difficult conditions in Italy, and continue to be targeted by the national and local media. The typical “us vs. them” dichotomy dominates the national press as well as in everyday speech. This extends to stereotypes, where Roma are described as ‘dirty’, ‘dishonest’, ‘superstitious’. The Italian media portrayal of migrants forced the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to launch an appeal to create guidelines for journalists reporting about immigrants and asylum seekers. Following this request, the National Council of Journalists’ Association and the Italian National Press Federation established a code of conduct for journalists reporting about migrants, refugees and asylum seekers.

Recently, the Centro d’ascolto dell’informazione radiotelevisiva, a monitoring body on broadcast information, presented a comprehensive analysis that looked at thousands of cases, both in TV and radio, and confirmed the concerns of minority rights activists of the constant connection made in the media between crime and Roma citizens. The findings of the project were presented in Rome, and the vice president of the Italian Senate, Emma Bonino, stated that it is necessary to create a monitoring body on information and media at a European level.

Indeed, Roma live in dangerous conditions all over Europe. The Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-2015 is a Europe-wide initiative to help impoverished and segregated Roma communities. European leaders are buoyant about the progress made in the inclusion of Roma, however there are many dissenting voices. Gelu Duminica, executive director of the Impreuna Agency for Community Development, a Roma organization based in Bucharest, believes the decade is a failure, because of the scarce effects of the initiatives promoted in EU member states. In the Balkan Insight article, journalist Nikoleta Popkostadinova calls on European states to put words into action on the ground. The strategy, which has the slogan “Nothing for Roma without Roma”, does not involve enough Roma communities, he says. Adam Ademi, who works at the Decade of Roma Inclusion’s Secretariat in Budapest, believes that ‘many believe that the Decade Action Plans are mainly focused to reach already involved and already aware citizens.’

I think projects for Roma integration should also address the mainstream society, in order to remove barriers that block inclusion. Certainly, the lack of integration of Roma in Europe is not only caused by inaccurate reporting, but also, and principally by the (lack of) policies to address these issues.

Protection of minorities is a condition for joining the European Union, but unfortunately member states are not really setting a good example. They are happy to consider Roma issues as a European issue when it involves integration (so that national governments can wash their hands of the problem), but when it involves expulsion they will argue it is a national issue, preventing any effective regional action.

Bosnia football ban to level the playing field for minorities? (Part 2)

Part 2 of a blog from Michelle Chan, who interns with MRG’s Legal Cases Programme, on UEFA’s controversial decision to ban Bosnia from international football. See Part 1

UEFA has announced that Bosnia will be banned from international football competitions as of 1 April 2011, due to the refusal of the national football federation (NSFBiH) to change its ethnic-based tripartite system, which mirrors the state system by rotating the presidency between a Serb, Croat and ethnic Muslim. A bold move against a promising team, with little control over the state-wide division of powers borne from the Dayton Peace Agreement, which ended the brutal conflict in 1995.

“[A]gainst having one president of anything in Bosnia, even a beekeeper’s association,” remarked Milorad Dodik, president of the Bosnian Serb region, to reporters after the announcement.

But Bosnia has made significant developments since 1995, joining the Council of Europe in 2002 and ratifying the European Convention of Human Rights and its Protocol without reservation, thus voluntarily agreeing to meet relevant standards including non-discrimination.

In 2008, Bosnia ratified the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union, committing itself to “amend electoral legislation regarding members of [its] Presidency” within one to two years. The European Court of Human Rights in a 2009 judgment points out these developments, suggesting that although the time may not be ripe for single majority rule in Bosnia, alternatives exist to make the system less discriminatory.

Reactions from football fans and commentators have been mixed: some remarking that football bodies should stay out of state politics, while others lament the corruption perceived to dominate the leadership of the NSFBiH.

It seems until some progress can be made towards alleviating Bosnia’s discriminatory power-sharing mechanisms, everybody loses. As coach, Ivica Osim told Bosnian media: “Only in football have we been able to attain a European level but unfortunately, everything else that’s wrong in the country has caught up with the game.”

Kicked out? Football fights discrimination in Bosnia (Part 1)

Michelle Chan, an intern with MRG’s Legal Cases Programme, wishes the Council of Europe could take ethnic-based politics in Bosnia as seriously as UEFA. See Part 2.

The 2-1 win for Bosnia against Romania on 26 March in the Euro 2012 qualifiers may be the last match Bosnian football fans see unless the Football Federation of Bosnia (NSFBiH) ends their discriminatory presidential system, according to UEFA, football’s governing body in Europe.

Although the NSFBiH’s system of leadership mirrors that of the country’s government, a similar threat to the state system is non-existent. Both systems restrict candidacy for the Presidency to a Serb, Croat and ethnic Muslim – the state’s ‘Constituent Peoples’ – and require that each serve a Presidential term of 18 months on a rotating basis. Bosnia’s national minorities – referred to as ‘Others’ – are therefore excluded, including Roma and Jews, who have lived in Bosnia for centuries, and those who choose not to identify as a Constituent People.

UEFA’s warning to suspend Bosnia from football as from 1 April 2011 for refusing to change this discriminatory practice is a noble move to preserve the sport’s values, including zero-tolerance of racism and the prohibition of discrimination of any kind, as reflected in article 3 of the FIFA Statute.

At the state level, however, the Bosnian parliament faces no such pressures, and has rejected proposals to remove the discriminatory constitutional provisions. This is in spite of a groundbreaking ruling in December 2009 by the European Court of Human Rights secured by MRG in favour of Dervo Sedjic and Jakob Finci, Bosnian citizens of Roma and Jewish ethnicity respectively, who are barred from standing for President or a member of the House of Peoples (part of Bosnia’s Parliament), as a result of their ethnicity/religion.

In April 2010, the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly drew attention to the urgent need for constitutional reform in Bosnia through its Resolution 1725 to prevent further discrimination in the October 2010 general elections. Regrettably, no political consensus has been reached on the amendments to date, as the Council’s Committee of Ministers have noted with concern.

But what the Council of Europe has failed to do is take UEFA’s laudable stance of zero-tolerance. It could in theory exercise similar powers to suspend Member States from their rights to representation on the Consultative Assembly (article 8 of the Council’s Statute). Just as the late goal by Edin Dzeko gave Bosnia the win over Romania, maybe UEFA’s threat to suspend Bosnia is the much needed kick to bring about an end to ethnic-based politics in Bosnia.